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I. INTRODUCTION

Attorney malpractice, as other areas of malpractice, has well defined
elements. Regardless of whether the malpractice claim is based on breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence, the plaintiff generally must
prove that the attorney failed to exercise a reasonable degree of skill in
counseling or representing the plaintiff and that such failure was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's damages or loss.' A leading treatise on legal
malpractice has stated the following: "[C ] o m mon to all theories of liability are
the prerequisites that there be a duty, which was breached[,j and proximate
causation of damage." 2

* Dusty Rhoades is an attorney practicing in Charleston, South Carolina, emphasizing
attorney malpractice.
** Laura W. Morgan is a Senior Research Attorney with the National Legal Research Group
in Charlottesville, Virginia, specializing in attorney malpractice and family law.
1. See, e.g., Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.S.C. 1992)
(mem.), aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993).
2. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.1, at401 (3d ed.
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In recent years, the question of what type of damages are compensable
has arisen with greater frequency. In essence, courts have been faced with
deciding whether emotional distress or mental suffering are compensable
consequential damages in a malpractice action.
This article will not address recovery of damages for emotional distress
that occur as the direct result of an attorney's malpractice, but instead it will
address recovery of emotional distress damages that occur as the consequential
result of the malpractice and are thus predicated upon other direct damages.
Consequential and direct damages are defined as follows: "Direct damages are
those damages which are the immediate, natural and anticipated consequences
of the wrong. Consequential damages are those which flow as a result of the
direct damages, and therefore depend upon special circumstances which are
not necessarily anticipated. 3
This article also will not address other non-economic consequential
damages, such as injury to reputation. Instead, it will discuss the majority rule
that denies recovery of damages for emotional distress unless the plaintiff has
suffered a physical injury or the attorney has acted egregiously. This article
will then review some recent cases that have focused on the nature of the
plaintiff's direct damages, rather than the nature of the attorney's conduct,
when considering whether damages for emotional distress or mental suffering
may be recovered in a legal malpractice action. Finally, this article will
conclude with what the authors hope is a common-sense rule to help
practitioners determine whether or not to pursue damages for emotional
distress in a legal malpractice case.
II. THE MAJORITY RULE AGAINST RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

The general rule against recovery of damages for emotional distress
caused by an attorney's legal malpractice may be expressed as follows:
Actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought against
attorneys have rarely been successful. The conduct serving as the basis of
the claim cannot be merely negligent, but must be extreme and outrageous,
wanton and malicious or coercive.
An attorney is not expected to foresee that an error he commits might
cause mental distress to his client.4

1989) (footnotes omitted).
3. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 890 (footnotes omitted).
4. 1 S.C. JUR.Attorney and Client § 68, at 172 (1991) (citing Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157,
276 S.E.2d 776 (1981); Caddel v. Gates, 284 S.C. 481, 327 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1984)).
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A vast majority of states follow this rule.'
follows:

Mallen and Smith have stated as

Almost all jurisdictions which have passed upon the issue have held
that damages for emotional injuries are not recoverable where they are a
consequence of other damages caused by the attorney's negligence. This
rule applies if the attorney's conduct does not involve fraud, intentional
conduct, a willful fiduciary breach or physical contact. 6
In South Carolina this rule is derived from two cases: Ford v. Hutson7
and Caddel v. Gates.' In Ford a real estate agent brought an action against
a home purchaser for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court
noted that "the concept of bringing an action seeking damages for mental and
emotional injury outside the scope of some traditionally recognized tort (e.g. [,]
assault[,] battery, false imprisonment) is a relatively novel one in this
country."' The court concluded that to recover for emotional distress, the
plaintiff must establish, among other things, that "the defendant intentionally
or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially

certain that such distress would result from his conduct."'

0

Therefore, an

attorney's mere negligence in handling a case could not serve as the predicate
for recovery of damages for emotional injury, because negligence is, by its
very nature, not intentional or reckless.
In Caddel this principle was stated more explicitly. There, a client

5. See, e.g., John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice:An Appraisal of the
CrumblingDike andthe ThreateningFlood, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1127, 1165 (1988) ("[E]motional

distress damages are not awarded unless the lawyer commits some more aggravated misconduct
than negligence: the cases require 'egregious conduct,' 'intentional wrongdoing,' 'extreme or
outrageous conduct,' 'willful or wanton' misconduct, or occurrencesof an inflammatory nature."
(footnotes omitted)); Joseph J. Kelleher, Note, An Attorney's Liabilityfor the NegligentInfliction

of EmotionalDistress,58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1309, 1319 (1990) ("The vast majority of appellate
decisions that have considered the issue have held that an attorney is not liable for emotional
distress damages where the attorney's conducthas been merely negligent.. . . Under the majority
rule, damages for emotional distress are awarded only when the plaintiff has suffered a physical
injury or the attorney has acted egregiously." (footnotes omitted)); see also John E. Theuman,
Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages Recoverable for Attorney's Negligence in
Preparingor Conducting Litigation - Twentieth Century Cases, 90 A.L.R.4TH 1033, 1060-63

(1991) (citing legal malpractice cases which have held that emotional distress damages were not
recoverable).
6. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 16.11, at 904 (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
7. 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776.

8. 284 S.C. 481, 327 S.E.2d 351.
9. Ford, 276 S.C. at 159, 276 S.E.2d at 777.
10. Id. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148,
154 (Me. 1979)).
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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brought an action against an attorney whose title certification failed to disclose
a recorded easement on the client's property. Addressing the client's claim for
mental anguish damages, the court concluded as follows:
Damages for mental anguish are recoverable by one who suffers and
proves the tort of outrage; this tort has developed slowly over the past
half-century. Suffice it to say that the conduct complained of must be
intentional or reckless and so outrageous as to be inconsonant with and
intolerable in a civilized society. We hold that a lawyer's overlooking of
an easement or other title encumbrance in searching public title records,
though negligent, will not be held by this court to be outrageous conduct.
Though regrettable, the overlooking of an encumbrance by an attorney
examining title is not antithetical to civilized society nor, we observe, is
it inconsonant with the normal conduct of a lawyer who is a lady or
gentleman in every respect, but human and subject to erring."
Inessence, under the majority rule - which we shall now call the "old"
rule - recovery for emotional distress or mental anguish will not be successful
if the jurisdiction does not recognize emotional distress or mental anguish
without physical injury as an independent tort. A plaintiff must thus establish
that the attorney's conduct was intentional or outrageous or that the conduct
caused physical injury accompanied by emotional distress. This requirement
is especially difficult in attorney malpractice cases because the basis for
liability is that the attorney's conduct was negligent.
Cunings v. Pinder2 also illustrates the old rule, which focuses on the

11. Caddel, 284 S.C. at 483-84, 327 S.E.2d at 352 (citation omitted).
12. 574 A.2d 843 (Del. 1990) (per curiam); see also Schonberger v. Serchuk, 742 F. Supp.
108, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing, under New York law, the portion of the client's legal
malpractice claim alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress because the client failed to
prove that the attorney's alleged misconduct unreasonably threatened the client's physical safety);
Whitehead v. Cuffie, 364 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the clients' allegation that
their attorney's misconduct was intentional and willful presented a material issue of fact
precluding summary judgment on the client's claim for emotional distress damages); O'Neil v.
Vasseur, 796 P.2d 134 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the trial court's refusal to allow the
client's claim for emotional distress damages caused by the attorneys' malpractice in the absence
of proof that the attorneys' conduct was so extreme and outrageous that they intended to inflict
emotional distress on their client); Kunau v. Pillers, Pillers & Pillers, P.C., 404 N.W.2d 573
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the attorney was not liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress becausethe attorney's failure to file timely notices of appeal was not intentional
or reckless); Segall v. Berkson, 487 N.E.2d 752 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (holding that the trial court
should have stricken the portion of the client's legal malpractice complaint alleging that he
suffered emotional distress caused by the attorney's negligent handling of his marriage dissolution
case); Selsnick v. Horton, 620 P.2d 1256 (Nev. 1980) (holding that the client's legal malpractice
claim for the attorney's failure to prosecute the appeal of a default judgment was premised solely
upon ordinary negligence, and absent proof of extreme and outrageous conduct by the attorney,
the client could not recover for emotional distress); Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343 (N.J.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/9
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nature of the attorney's conduct. In Cummings the lawyer failed to advice his
client fully of her right to pursue a claim against her own insurance carrier,
unilaterally increased his agreed contingency fee from twenty-five percent to
one third, and intentionally, and without notice to his client, stopped payment
on his client's settlement check. 3 The court concluded that the lawyer's
intentional and outrageous misconduct supported an award of damages for
emotional distress in the client's legal malpractice action against the lawyer.'"
A "new" rule, however, is now emerging. As the discussion below
hopefully makes clear, recovery for emotional distress or mental anguish as
a consequential damage of attorney malpractice is not recognized when the
direct damage that flows from the attorney malpractice is strictly pecuniary or
economic in nature. However, when the direct damage interferes with a
personal interest of the client, such as liberty or family, the courts have been
willing to allow recovery of consequential damages for emotional distress or
mental anguish caused by the attorney's misconduct. The focus has thus
shifted from the nature of the attorney's conduct to the nature of the plaintiff's
loss.
III. RECENT CASES DISALLOWING DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS BASED ON THE PECUNIARY NATURE OF THE

PLAINTIFF'S DIRECT DAMAGES

As noted above, the majority of jurisdictions prohibit recovery for
emotional distress caused by mere attorney negligence. 5 These courts base
their holdings on whether the alleged attorney misconduct was intentional or
reckless, thereby focusing the inquiry on the nature of the attorney's conduct.
However, some courts have focused the inquiry on the nature of the plaintiff's
direct damages and have concluded that consequential damages for emotional
distress are not recoverable when the client's direct damages are strictly
economic or pecuniary. This new rule thus focuses on the nature of the
plaintiff's loss.
Smith v. Superior Court 6 illustrates the application of the new rule. In
Smith the California Court of Appeals stated as follows:

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that damages were not recoverable in the clients' legal
malpractice action because of the absence of egregious or extraordinary circumstances and
physical injury); Heath v. Herron, 732 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the
attorney's conduct in failing to file a verified answer, which deprived his client of a viable
defense, was not egregious or extraordinary as required to support an award of damages for
emotional distress).
13. 574 A.2d at 845.
14. Id.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
16. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992).
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Mhe primary interest protected in legal malpractice actions is economic
and "serious emotional distress is not an inevitable consequence of the loss
of money .... "
- .."[T]he foreseeability of serious emotional harm to the client and
the degree of certainty that the client suffered such injury by loss of an
economic claim are tenuous. Litigation is an inherently uncertain vehicle
for advancing one's economic interests. .

.

. The closeness of the

connection between the defendants' conduct and the injury suffered is
problematic. Litigation is almost always distressing for litigants.... The
policy of preventing future harm is served by the sanction of compensation
for the economic loss occasioned by the malpractice." 7
The court thus held that a legal malpractice claim based on mere negligence
will not support a recovery of damages for mental distress when the attorney's
8
tortious conduct has resulted in only economic injury to the client. 1
The California Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Pleasant
v. Celli. 9 In Pleasantthe client sued her attorney for malpractice after the
attorney allowed the statute of limitations to expire on the client's medical
malpractice claim. The court found that the attorney's negligent conduct had
resulted in only economic loss to the client and held that the client could not
recover damages for emotional distress. The court stated as follows:
Generally, the only foreseeable impact on the plaintiff from an attorney's
wrongdoing is an economic loss. It is foreseeable that the plaintiff would
be annoyed and inconvenienced by the attorney's failure, for example, to
file suit within the applicable statute of limitations. However, the
disappointment one might feel upon learning that counsel has missed a
filing deadline falls far short of the shock, grief, anxiety or nervousness
which characterize the cases imposing liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
Litigation is frequently stressful and disagreeable, even when one is a
plaintiff. It is not reasonably foreseeable that prolonged litigation would
cause any especial trauma above and beyond the stresses inherent in
20
litigation generally.
Other cases have followed this approach to analyzing claims for emotional
distress caused by attorney malpractice. For example, in Richards v.

17. Id. at 136 (quoting Merenda v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 91-92 (Ct. App.
1992)).
18. Id. at 137.

19. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App. 1993).
20. Id. at 670 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/9
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'
Cousins21
the clients sued their attorney after he failed to take proper

measures to protect their interest in certain property. The court, refusing to
allow damages for emotional distress because the clients had suffered only
economic damages as a result of the attorney's malpractice, stated as follows:
[The clients'] losses were strictly pecuniary. [The clients'] actual
damages are their respective portions of the amounts deducted from the
proceeds of the sale of the house .... We can find no cases in our
jurisprudence, and [the clients] have cited none in their brief, where
damages for mental anguish or emotional distress were awarded when a
plaintiff suffered a purely monetary loss.'
Similarly, in Cornell v. Wunschel' the court focused on the pecuniary
nature of the plaintiff's loss even though the claim against the attorney was
based on fraudulent misrepresentation rather than negligence:
One of the keys to an award of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation
is that the party committing the fraud could have contemplated the claimed
damage as a consequence of the fraud at the time the misrepresentation
was made. Damages for mental distress are not ordinarily contemplated
in a business transaction; thus, few courts have recognized their availability as an element of fraud damages.24
The court determined that damages for mental distress could not be had
because "'deceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort.' "'
The same result was reached in Hilt v. Bernstein.26 In that case, the
court distinguished McEvoy v. Helikson,27 which had allowed recovery of
emotional distress damages based on an attorney's negligence.28 The Hilt
court held that unlike McEvoy, in which the damages suffered by the plaintiff
were the loss of his legal right to child custody,2 9 the harm in Hilt was

21. 550 So. 2d 1273 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 552 So. 2d 397 (La. 1989).
22. Richards, 550 So. 2d at 1278.
23. 408 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1987).
24. Id. at 382.
25. Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2, at 602
(1973)); accord Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Me. 1987) ("[P]ecuniary loss is an
essential element of a fraud action and ...damages for emotional or mental pain and suffering
are not recoverable.").
26. 707 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 715 P.2d 92 (Or. 1986).
27. 562 P.2d 540 (Or. 1977), supersededby rule on other grounds as stated in Moore v.
Willis, 767 P.2d 62 (Or. 1988).
28. See infra part IV.
29. 562 P.2d at 544.
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strictly economic - the plaintiff's right to share equitably in a marital asset. 0
The Hilt court stated, "Plaintiff's invaded interest is solely an economic one;
that she was required to engage in legal action regarding that interest does not

change its character. "31
It should be pointed out that the decisions focusing on the purely
pecuniary nature of the plaintiffs loss are somewhat inconsistent. As noted
above, in Smith v. Superior Court2 the court refused to allow damages for
emotional distress arising from economic harm. In Tara Motors v. Superior
Court,3 however, the appellate court developed a different rule. There, the
court held that a requirement of "substantial economic loss" would prevent
abusive, unfounded allegations of emotional distress.34
Gore v. Rains & Block35 also stands apart from both the old and the new
rule. In that case, the attorney negligently handled the plaintiff's medical
malpractice claim. The attorney conceded his failure to file the medical
malpractice claim within the statute of limitations period, but he claimed that
legal malpractice had not occurred because the value of the underlying suit
was zero, and therefore, the plaintiff had not been damaged.36 The jury
found otherwise and awarded the plaintiff $60,000 for his medical malpractice
37
claim and $60,000 for mental anguish on the legal malpractice claim.
The appellate court affirmed the award of damages for mental anguish,
even though the plaintiff failed to prove any physical injury produced as a
result of the emotional distress caused by the legal malpractice. 3 The court
held, without great discussion, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
damages to the extent of the injury, which in this case included the underlying
physical injury caused by the medical malpractice and the mental anguish
39
caused by the legal malpractice.
In cases concerning damages for emotional distress arising out of attorney
negligence, the modem trend is a shift in focus from the defendant's conduct
to the plaintiffs loss. From that perspective, Tara Motors makes sense. The

30. Hilt, 707 P.2d at 96.
31. Id.
32. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992).
33. 276 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Ct. App. 1990), petition for review granted, 807 P.2d 418 (Cal.),
review dismissed and cause remanded, 812 P.2d 563 (Cal. 1991).
34. Tara Motors, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 609; see also Salley v. Childs, 541 A.2d 1297 (Me. 1988)
(holding severe emotional distress was a "foreseeable" result of an attorney's malpractice when
result of malpractice was the suspension of the plaintiff's horse training license and loss of
income).
35. 473 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
36. Id. at 816-17.
37. Id. at 821.
38. Id. at 818.
39. Id. at 819.
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TaraMotors court declined to predicate the recovery of damages for emotional
distress on the defendant's conduct, focusing instead on the nature of the
plaintiff's loss. By requiring that the damages be "substantial," the court took
the speculative nature of the emotional distress out of the equation. Gore,
however, simply cannot be reconciled with either the old rule or the new rule.
IV. RECENT CASES ALLOWING DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS BASED ON THE PERSONAL NATURE OF
THE PLAINTIFF'S DIRECT DAMAGES

A. Liberty Loss
When an attorney's negligence causes a client's loss of liberty, courts
have been willing to step away from the general rule barring damages for
emotional distress. Generally, these cases hold that when an attorney
represents a criminal defendant, incarceration is the foreseeable result of
negligence. Accordingly, damages for the mental anguish arising from that
foreseeable result, a non-pecuniary damage, should not be barred.
Typical of such cases is Holliday v. Jones,' in which the plaintiff was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The appellate court reversed and
remanded on the ground that defense counsel was incompetent. The plaintiff
was acquitted at the retrial. The plaintiff then sued his original attorney for
professional negligence and was awarded $400,000 for emotional distress.
The appellate court affirmed the award of damages for emotional distress,
distinguishing those cases which prohibit recovery for emotional distress based
on harm to a property interest as follows:
If the purpose in prohibiting the award of emotional distress damages
absent physical injury or intentional or affirmative misconduct is to screen
out fraudulent or speculative claims, the necessity for such screening is
simply nonexistent here when loss of liberty and its consequent impact on

[the client] is not only a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of [the
attorney's] professional incompetence in defending [the client] in his
murder trial, but virtually a guaranteed result."

Thus, recovery of damages for emotional distress should turn on whether the
plaintiff's injury is pecuniary or non-pecuniary, and should not rest on the
reprehensibility of the attorney's conduct.
The court in Wagenmann v. Adams42 reached the same result. In that

40. 264 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1989).
41. Id. at 457.
42. 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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case, the client, after his arrest, was forcibly committed to a mental hospital.
The court found that the plaintiff was placed in the mental hospital as a direct
and proximate result of the attorney's ineffectiveness and held that the attorney
was liable for the plaintiff's emotional distress.43 The court carefully
distinguished Wagenmann's loss of liberty from those cases involving merely
pecuniary loss as follows:
As a direct and proximate result of [the attorney's] ineffectiveness, the
plaintiff was forcibly deprived of his liberty and dispatched to a mental
hospital. The fright and suffering incident to such a wrenching dislocation
can hardly be overstated. ....We decline [the attorney's] invitation to
relieve him of the foreseeable consequences of his malpractice by the
overly simplistic expedient of relabelling the resultant award as damages
for "emotional distress. " 44
Of course, some courts have disagreed with this analysis and have focused
exclusively on whether the attorney's conduct was intentional or reckless. 45
Thus, in order for counsel to successfully make the argument that damages for
emotional distress may be had when an attorney's negligence results in
incarceration, counsel must first persuade the court to shift the focus from the
attorney's conduct to the nature of the plaintiffs loss.
Finally, it should be noted that courts have not been willing to recognize
a claim for emotional distress in cases in which the incarcerated person
commits suicide. 46 For example, in Snyder v. Baumecker47 the court held
that an attorney could not be held liable for.a client's suicide on a theory of
legal malpractice. Although the court conceded the suicide was caused by the
attorney's delay in prosecuting the criminal defense, suicide was simply not
a foreseeable risk of malpractice.48
43. Id. at 221-22.
44. Id. at 221; accord Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91 (D.N.J. 1988) (mem.) (holding
inmate was entitled to offer proof of damages for emotional distress attributable to extra period
of confinement when inmate claimed his counsel's negligent advice resulted in a longer sentence
than he would have otherwise received).
45. Cf. Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 306 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. Ct. App.
1983) (holding plaintiff, who claimed emotional distress damages for injury to reputation,
humiliation, and mental and physical strain incident to his arrest, may not recover without a
showing of physical injury because the attorney's conduct was neither intentional nor voluntary),
aff'd, 311 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 118 (Kan. 1984) (stating
the rule that recovery for emotional distress without physical injury is allowed only if the
negligent act is wanton or willful).
46. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Liability of Attorney for Suicide of Client
Based on Attorney's ProfessionalAct or Omission, 41 A.L.R.4TH 351 (1985) (listing cases

deciding the attorney's liability for a client's suicide).
47. 708 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989).
48. Id. at 1463-64; accordMcLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983) (noting
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/9
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B. Family Loss
An older North Carolina case, Carroll v. Rountree,49 notes the distinction between economic loss and personal loss in a family law case. In Carroll
a former client brought a breach of contract action against his attorney for
failing to perform certain tasks relative to the client's divorce.50 The court
held that in a typical breach of contract action, damages for mental and
emotional distress are not normally recoverable because they are not viewed
as the foreseeable consequences of the breach. 51 However, there are
exceptions to this general rule in such cases as a breach of contract to marry,
because the subject matter of the contract is more of a "personal" rather than
a "commercial" nature. The court noted:
While we readily concede that there could be contracts between attorney
and client so personal in nature that the attorney could be assumed to have
entered the contract with the knowledge that a failure to fulfill the

obligation thereunder in the manner contemplated by the parties would
naturally and probably result in the client's suffering mental anguish, we

do not think
the contract which is the subject of this action falls in that
52
category.

Therefore in cases with particularly personal subject matters, such as family
relations, it may be possible to obtain damages for emotional distress because
the harm is reasonably foreseeable.
One of the first cases to explicitly allow recovery of damages for
emotional distress as a result of an attorney's negligence was McEvoy v.
Helikson.5 3 In McEvoy the parties stipulated and the court imposed a duty
on the attorney for the wife, a citizen of Switzerland, not to return the wife's
passport to her without first obtaining the return of the child to the husband. 4
The attorney breached that duty and the wife took the child to Switzerland.
The husband then sued the wife's attorney alleging malpractice and seeking

that suicide was a deliberate intervening act that broke the chain of causation between attorney's
negligence and damages); McPeake v. Cannon, 553 A.2d 439, 440-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(finding that suicide constitutes independent intervening act so extraordinary that it could not have
been foreseen by the attorney who negligently handled incarcerated client's case).
49. 237 S.E.2d 566 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd on reh'g, 243 SE.2d 821 (N.C. Ct. App.
1978), review denied, 248 S.E.2d 725 (N.C. 1978).
50. Carroll,237 S.E.2d at 568-69.
51. Id. at 572.
52. Id.
53. 562 P.2d 540 (Or. 1977), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Moore v.
Willis, 767 P.2d 62 (Or. 1988).
54. Id. at 541.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:837

damages for his emotional distress. 5
The court had little trouble finding that the wife's attorney breached the
duty owed to the husband. In regards to the damages for the alleged mental
anguish, the court stated, "It follows, in our opinion, that conduct by
defendant which resulted in an infringement of that legal right, if established
by evidence on trial, would entitle plaintiff to recover damages for 'anguish
and mental [suffering] due to the loss of his minor child,' as alleged in the
56
complaint."
Other jurisdictions have followed this analysis. In Person v. Behnke 7
the plaintiff alleged that the attorney he retained to represent him in a divorce
"failed to take any action on plaintiffs behalf" and thus "lost custody of his
children and effective visitation with them"58 The court held that "a valid
claim exists for noneconomic damages resulting from a plaintiff's loss of
custody and visitation of his children which allegedly resulted from an
59
attorney's negligence."
However, fearful that there might be an explosion of attorney malpractice
cases brought by disgruntled parents who dislike the results of their divorce
proceedings, the court refocused on defendant attorney's conduct. The court
limited the scope of its holding to only those more egregious cases of legal
malpractice.' ,Specifically, the court adopted the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington6 "as the criteria for judging whether an attorney's alleged malpractice
in representation of that attorney's client in a divorce proceeding can serve as
the basis for the client's subsequent claim that he lost custody or visitation of
his child as a direct result of the attorney's malpractice. "62
While the courts seem to be moving in the direction of a rule that would
allow damages for emotional distress which is predicated upon a direct nonpecuniary injury, some courts have hesitated in applying this rule. In Timms
v. Rosenblum 63 a litigant claimed that her former lawyer's malpractice
deprived her custody of her children for two years. Furthermore, she alleged
that she incurred an additional expense of $100,000 to get them back.'

55. Id. at 542.
56. Id. at 544.
57. 611 N.E.2d 1350 (I11.App. Ct.), cert.. denied, 622 N.E.2d 1226 (I11.1993).
58. Person, 611 N.E.2d at 1352 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 1353.
60. Id. at 1355.
61. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under this standard, the plaintiff must show "(1) his counsel's
performance was seriously deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced his case." Person, 611 N.E.2d at 1356.
62. Person, 611 N.E.2d at 1355-56.
63. 713 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Va. 1989) (mem.), aff'd, 900 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1990).
64. Timms, 713 F. Supp. at 950.
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Citing Virginia's traditional emotional distress rules, the court held that for the
plaintiff to recover: (1) the defendant must have acted intentionally or
recklessly; or (2) the plaintiff's mental anguish must have resulted from
physical injury.'
The court found that neither criteria was met in the
case.

66

More importantly, the court declined to distinguish malpractice cases
involving family law or custody issues from any other professional malpractice
cases:
Any lawyer who has practiced for any substantial time in virtually any area
of law will immediately confirm that parties in all of these areas make
substantial emotional investments in their causes and suffer mental anguish
in the event of an adverse result. This is manifestly so in areas of civil
litigation involving claims of employment discrimination, wrongful
discharge, civil rights violations, handicapped rights violations, labor
disputes, worker's compensation, and indeed even patent, copyright, and
corporate disputes. Mental anguish is not restricted to parties to child
custody disputes; it is experienced by parties to any lawsuit to the extent
they are emotionally involved in the subject of the lawsuit.67
Therefore, in the case of loss of familial relationships, plaintiff's counsel
will have to stress the unique nature of their injury and its totally noncommercial aspects.
V. CONCLUSION
Allowing damages for emotional distress where the client's personal
interests are harmed is a welcome and appropriate departure from the majority
rule. This new rule comports with the fundamental principles of tort law,
which rests on competing and complimentary considerations: "(I) the need for
compensation, (2) precedent, (3) the defendant's culpability, (4) convenience
of administration, (5) the parties' capacity to bear the loss, and (6) deter68
rence."
Harm to a personal interest, as opposed to a pecuniary interest, demands
compensation, because harm to a personal interest virtually guarantees that
emotional distress will result. Further, the growing trend to establish such
liability on the part of an attorney will establish both precedent and the ability
to predict liability, thus creating an ease of judicial administration. When

65. Id. at 954-55.
66. Id. at 955.

67. Id.
68. Kelleher, supra note 5, at 1323; see also
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND

§ 4, at 20-26 (5th ed. 1984).
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attorneys kmow that in certain kinds of cases damages for emotional distress
may be awarded, then attorneys may be more diligent in those cases. This
extra diligence can only redound to the benefit of all attorneys.
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